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England's Danger;

[W. J. Ching]

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OR,

Per. cap. 7

J.C.

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REFORM UNMASKED.

“Cum hominum animi, vanis timoribus et suspicionibus implentur,
“calumniæ et maledicta in principes; sine ullo veri falsive discrimine,
“avidè accipiuntur, avidè communicantur.”

FAM. STRADA *de Bello Belg.*

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN HATCHARD AND SON,

BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS,

NO. 190, OPPOSITE ALBANY, PICCADILLY.

1819.

AL 911. 1819. C49

ENGLAND'S DANGER,

&c.

TO THE PEOPLE.

ENGLISHMEN! you stand on a precipice. Dangers surround you. Beware, lest fleeing from one evil, you fall into a greater. Be not deceived. Pause and ponder before you act. Think him only your friend, who, honestly and without disguise, points out to you your peril, and the way to shun it. Already has your rashness, or rather the precipitancy of your leaders, compelled you to the brink; and would now urge you on to destruction, if you would but listen to their seductive words.

What is it you ask? What is it they teach you to demand? Reform in Parliament; annual elections; and universal suffrage. These are the means, by which they promise you, relief from taxation, and the security or

restoration of some rights, real or imaginary, of the people. But who is there, that does not perceive, that taxation has no reference to reform, to annual Parliaments, or universal suffrage; or that the rights of the people need not these securities? The men, who ring such ceaseless changes on these words, as if there were magic in their sound, tell you you are reasonable beings; and, that because you are reasonable, therefore you have rights. So far I believe them: and it is because you are reasonable, I speak to you in the language of reason; and, because you have rights, that I ask you to consider of their nature.

God forbid, that, if indeed your rights are invaded, or you are treated as irrational beings, I should be the advocate of such a system, or prostitute my pen to defend a tyranny! No, my countrymen! My fathers, like yours, have bought with a struggle, and paid the price with their blood, of those rights, of those privileges, which, like you, I would hand down undiminished to my children. Were reform, were universal suffrage, nay, were a revolution, with all its attendant horrors, necessary to maintain or to repair them, there is none more willing than I, to brave every danger and count every peril as nothing, for their restoration or support. It is not to advocate a party, or uphold a system, but because I love my

country, and think she is in danger, that I now address you.

Where then does the danger lie? In our foreign relations; an universal and profound peace has followed a glorious and universal triumph. No nation is willing, or, if jealousy make any willing, none dare rouse England's sleeping lion. Europe reposes beneath the shield of our arms, and Britain holds a pre-eminence in the earth, her bitterest slanderers would be proud of. It is within; it is in faction at home, the madness of sedition, the enterprises of treason, that rests our danger. The meanest of the multitude, deluded by the artifices of the worst and most designing of men, have, by their violence, compelled the state to resort to the measures necessary for its own protection. It is in the struggle of the many against the powerful; it is in the fierce contention of these opposing parties, whose opposition is founded in deception and fomented by treason, that I find cause for fear. I dread, and I confess that dread, lest reform mean revolution; lest the privileges of the people mean the degradation of the Crown.

Already do the most hardy, boldly avow, that a revolution is necessary. The leaders, when they dare unmask their designs, talk

openly of the necessity of such a measure. Is not their language, Reform is necessary; but how can you expect the House of Commons, so constituted as it is, to listen to the voice of the people, and reform itself? They profanely wrest Scripture to their purposes, and say, "A corrupt tree bringeth not forth good fruit;" and hence they infer an evident necessity, for the people to take the power into their own hands; and imagining, or forging, a precedent that never existed, they claim a restitution of annual, or, as they term it, constitutional Parliaments, and universal suffrage.

Suppose, all that you require were granted. Suppose, for a moment, that the elective franchise was communicated, to every man indiscriminately, of a sound mind, who has attained one-and-twenty. Have you then come to the line defined by nature or by reason? for, to talk of the line of the constitution, in such schemes, is impossible: a general right of suffrage never did exist, and was never exercised; the constitution never recognized it, for it never could have maintained it. By what right, for what reason, do you here draw the line?—Wherever you fix an arbitrary boundary, by your own principles, you erect a tyranny: what right then, have you, by this sweeping limitation of the elective franchise, to exclude the whole

class of women from its exercise? Or, what is a more arbitrary limitation of the time of manhood, than one-and-twenty? Have women no rights; or, is the weakness of infancy alone to be unguarded? For, by your own argument, if the rights of women be not represented, they must be liable to aggression; the weakness of childhood must be trampled under foot, unless protected by its voice in the national senate. But, say you, women are represented by their husbands, children by their parents; nature has delegated their rights to others, who exercise them on their behalf, and are responsible to the God of nature to use them for their benefit.—How then, are unmarried women, of full age and sound mind, to be represented? Are they, the most defenceless of their weaker sex, to be alone excluded from protection? Or why, since nature emancipates one man from the leading-strings of childhood at eighteen, and continues them round another to four-and-twenty, do you arbitrarily fix one-and-twenty, as the unchanging epocha of all men's emancipation? By this rule, some, whom nature and opportunity have freed from parental bondage at an earlier period, must be unrepresented, which would be unjust to them; and those, who remain subject to their parents' control to a later time, must be doubly represented,

once in themselves, and once in their fathers, which would be unjust to others.

To avoid these evils, and keep clear of what, on the wild principles of this reform, would be a tyranny, we must extend universal suffrage, wherever the term will carry us, and summon to our election of representatives all who have rights to be represented. Nor can we exclude women and children, from their voice in this election, on any pretence, except their defenceless weakness, which makes the necessity of their representative protection, but the more obvious: yet, what enthusiast is so wild, what lover of liberty so untaught, as to dream of calling to our national elections, for political purposes, women and children? Or, if pressed by the principles you avow, you admit this necessity, why do you stop here? Are rights limited by nature, to the human race? Or does not the breast of every man, not altogether so barbarous, as to have driven humanity from his bosom, acknowledge that brutes have, at least, the right of protection against wanton cruelty? But, if only those rights can be protected, which are immediately represented, either you must infringe on the law of nature, by denying the right of brutes to protection against cruelty, or call them too, to elect their representatives in the national council. By your own argument, either

their rights must be unprotected, because unre-presented; which is a tyranny: or you must deny them rights; which is to belie the best feelings of your nature: or, again, you must call on them to choose their representatives, for the protection of those rights, by a voice in your national councils; which is absurd.

The principle of universal suffrage, must therefore, be erroneous. Pressed to its farthest, it leads to an absurdity, revolting to the meanest understanding; and, left midway, it creates a tyranny, which destroys itself. Since then, there must be some line drawn, for the limitation of the elective franchise; what line can be better, than that which is defined by law, assented to by custom, and sanctioned by reason? A line so wide, as to admit all proper persons within its limit; and yet so narrow, as to exclude most improper classes from its pale. Calmly and dispassionately, let us examine the boundaries drawn by this line; for, on the truth or falsehood of my assertion, depends the whole question, of an enlargement of suffrage. If the right of voting for members of Parliament, as now established, be not sufficiently comprehensive, to embrace all the wholesome purposes of a representative government, it should undoubtedly be extended; but if, it comprise every thing necessary for the protection of the subject and

the security of the state, then let us, by all means, hold fast to it, nor lightly swerve from the institutions of our fathers, founded, as they are, on reason; sanctioned, as they have been, by the acquiescence of ages. Let us beware of revolution under the semblance of reform; nor permit those, who call so loudly for privilege and liberty, to drive us, through anarchy, into despotism.

The law of England, and what is the law of England is the constitution of England, has vested, the elective franchise for county members, in every freeholder possessing a freehold of forty shillings per annum. This is obviously sufficient for the representation of every man, having a permanent landed interest in the county to be represented. The right was originally fixed at this point, because forty shillings a year, was then supposed to be the lowest sum, which could render a man independent in his vote; and the limit has continued there, notwithstanding the alteration in the value of money, because other checks, less objectionable than diminishing the right of voting, have been opposed to the dominion of influence. Nor, can the most zealous reformer question the justness of this limit, any longer than he advocates, the absurdity of universal suffrage. It is a limit so low, as to comprehend every man permanently interested in

the welfare of the county; and yet so high, by requiring the estate in right of which he votes to be freehold, as to exclude all, who have none, or only transitory interests.

In boroughs, the franchise varies according to their original charters or ancient customs. In some places, the right of voting for their representatives is conferred on every one boiling a pot within the district; which, as it embraces every head of a family, however mean, will, I presume, be allowed sufficiently democratic: in others, this right is conferred, either on all inhabitants within the township contributing to the support of the church and state, by the payment of king's taxes and parish rates, that is, on the payers of scot and lot; or on all those having an interest in the borough, as freemen; or on those having the principal interest, as capital burgesses; or on those who, from their offices, commonly elective, must be supposed to represent the interest of all, as when confined to the corporate body. In all these cases, however they may vary, it was evidently to the voice of the people, the appeal was originally directed, and, but for the infirmity of all human institutions, would still be made.

If this be admitted, it is then objected, that the elective franchise is now enjoyed by many boroughs insignificant, or wholly decay-

ed, while large and populous towns of modern rise are totally excluded from its exercise; and that representation by counties is unequal, because Rutland, the least, sends the same number of representatives as Middlesex or Yorkshire, the richest and most populous. These objections would, perhaps, be valid and unanswerable, if each member of Parliament distinctly represented the town or county for which he sits; but, while his duty is particularly to watch over the peculiar interests of his constituents, he is, by them, sent to the great national council, there to represent the interest of the nation at large, not merely of the individual part by which he has been elected. Otherwise, all our foreign possessions, all our external relations, the whole naval power, the whole military glory of the country, those objects in which the people are so largely and so deeply interested, would not be represented at all. But every member, when once elected, being a member of Parliament, and not of the town or county that sent him there, and representing in the national council, the interests of the whole nation, and not of any of its particular parts; all that constitutes the glory and welfare of the nation is there represented, and consequently protected.

Thus it is, that Birmingham and Sheffield, though not directly enjoying the elective fran-

chise, are yet as fully represented in Parliament as London or York. In proof of which and of the protection afforded equally to the unrepresented towns as to the represented; I may defy faction itself, in the whole page of our history, even to warp a single fact, into a constructive oppression upon any town, because it may have wanted direct representation. The whole body is interested in the welfare of all its parts, and therefore all are protected alike.

Besides, would you push the principle of equality of representation, you must extend it to Ireland and Scotland, or show the reasons for their exclusion: that is, every Scotch and Irish county and considerable town, must send two members to Parliament, or be inadequately represented. But what right have you to limit representation to principal towns; or, how will you define a principal town? Are liberty and protection only due to large places; or, are small places necessarily to submit to the interests or the will of the large? Once avow this, and the right of the strongest will become the acknowledged law, and violence alone bear sway. But, were representation extended to every place indiscriminately, it must still be unequal, since one town consists of ten families and another of ten thousand; to say nothing, of the inconvenient size and tumultuous nature of the meetings of such numerous representa-

tives, as would on this plan be absolutely requisite. But, say the Reformers, take the elective franchise from the smaller towns, and confer it on the larger. By what right, but that of the strongest, can you take away from a borough its privileges, merely because it is decayed, to confer them on another place, merely because it has them not? And what is the right of the strongest, but an impudent usurpation, a barefaced tyranny?

Again, it is said, that the boroughs open a door to all manner of corruption, and that members are returned by them to serve in Parliament for fear or favour, that they sell their votes, and betray their country.

That influence and gold should have weight with men, is not the fault of the borough system, but of human nature. To destroy that weight, it is not the system, but our nature, that must be reformed. Were a reform of humanity the real object of these Reformers, I too would join them heart and hand; but reckless of the state of mankind, they aim only at overthrowing the constitution they profess to amend.

Were society composed of numbers alone, I admit, that the elective franchise vested in the hands of individuals, or of corporate bodies,

liable to the bribery of wealth, or the influence of power, would be an unequal, and, therefore, an unjust distribution : but in society, constituted as it is, by the laws of nature and the necessities and consent of all mankind, there must be wealth as the consequent of industry, and power as the consequent of station; and influence is but the consequent of that wealth or station. By every principle of justice, he that has the most of rights to be represented should be most represented, whether those rights be natural, as the rights of freedom and protection, or acquired, as of wealth and station. The same door which is opened by the borough system to corruption, lets in with that very corruption, this right of increased representation in the wealthier and more powerful members of the social system. It is by this means chiefly, that the floating commercial capital, and the vast trading interest of this country, is represented; and by this means alone, do all power and dignity, whether hereditary or accidental, find their representatives in the British senate. Our constitution, you are told indeed, consists of King, Lords, and Commons; three distinct and independent powers; and that neither of the former can interfere in the creation of the latter. Theoretically it is so. The King cannot, the King dare not, directly interfere in the election of members of Parliament, neither can the

Lords do so, in their collective or individual capacity; yet, our ancestors, in laying down this, as the principle of the constitution, could not, and did not intend to exclude, either the Crown, or the Peers, from the exercise of their hereditary influence: otherwise, they would not have opened the doors of the Lower House, to the servants of the one and the sons of the other. They would not have permitted the ministers, who guide the powers of the Crown, or the members of noble families, in whose interests their heads must necessarily be involved, to serve in Parliament. Nor is this interference without its example, or re-action, among the people. Does not the popular voice, indirectly indeed, but yet continually, interfere in the creation of Peers; and is not the love of the people the firmest bulwark of the Throne?

If, then, the country consist of wealth and dignity, as well as of numbers; if, by the intention of the framers of our excellent constitution, the indirect influence of the Crown and Nobles, was not meant to be excluded; if in practice the people daily interfere both with the Sovereign and the Peers; and if, as the fact is, the interest of the whole be so amalgamated, that what is beneficial to one must be so to all; is it a sufficient reason for abrogating the ancient system of boroughs in this country,

that they afford an opportunity, for the influence of wealth and power on the election of members of Parliament? How would the people of England, now-a-days, bear to be told by their sovereign, in answer to their remonstrance, for the removal of a wicked and corrupt minister, that, by the constitution, the choice of his servants was vested in the Prince alone, and that their interference in that choice, was unconstitutional and dangerous? Yet, this must be the reply of the Crown, to those presenting such a remonstrance, were the Crown guided by the modern doctrines of reform. If the Crown have no right to interfere in the choice of popular representatives, the people can have no right to interfere with the Crown, in the choice of those, to whom the direction of its prerogatives shall be intrusted.

Let us now turn to a brief review, of the practical effects resulting from the present system of representation. In this country, there are two great leading interests among the commons; the landed, and the commercial, or manufacturing: the first of these, is directly represented in Parliament, principally by the knights of the shire, or county members; and the last by the burgesses or borough members. Again, the King and Lords, though composing in themselves distinct branches of the great Parlia-

ment of the nation, are yet practically represented in the Lower House, by means of the indirect influence exercised, by the Crown, through the medium of its ministers, and by the Lords, through the extent of their possessions, on the election of members. But this influence is not confined to the King, or the Nobles. Every rich commoner does, and of necessity must, exercise the same in a greater or less degree. Nor is this influence limited to wealth, or rank; eloquence and talents are continually employed, to bribe or deceive the electors; nor can any law exclude, that species of almost feudal influence, possessed by certain families over particular districts. In this way, and in this way alone, power, talent, wealth, and hereditary distinction, all that constitute **THE COUNTRY**, are represented in the British House of Commons. There, practically and really, do all the members, forming in their combination *The Country*, meet by their representatives, to discuss and decide on their common interests. Unread indeed, must he be, in the history of Parliament, and unobservant of what is daily passing before his own eyes, who does not know, that every great national question is agitated, and in effect decided, in the Commons. There, every resolve of war and peace, every foreign and domestic measure, is fully and largely entered into. There, the expediency of external

conquest, or of internal regulation, is equally brought under review. The Lords indeed, have in theory, an equal right to make and sanction laws, to approve or disapprove of measures: but who does not see, that this right is usually exercised in a secondary degree to the Commons? who does not perceive the influence which the votes of the Lower House have over the conduct of the Upper? The King too, has a final affirmative or negative on all laws: that, being the executive of the constitution, he may only execute those laws, which he has himself approved; but the Commons, by impugning the conduct of his advisers, have greatly restricted the exercise of this branch of royal prerogative.

Thus the interests of the whole being discussed, and in great measure decided, in the Lower House, all are interested in the election of its members, and all ought to be there represented. This is done by the present system and the modifications it has grafted on the constitution. Were members of Parliament returned by the Commons only, as in theory they ought to be, then the House of Commons would exclusively represent the people; and then, still adhering to theory and ancient practice, only those questions ought to be moved in it, which relate exclusively to the welfare of the people.

War and peace, the choice and conduct of Ministers, the injustice of Judges, and the maintenance and control of an armed and disciplined military, being all, by the constitution, confided to the Crown; with them, and ten thousand other of the leading interests of the State, the Commons could have nothing to do. In short, we must relapse into barbarism, and give up our thoughts and wills, to the guidance of our superiors. Either we must abandon the theoretical principles of our constitution, those principles now so loudly clamoured for, and on which alone all good government can rest, the principles of representative legislation, or we must admit the corruptions which time and necessity have introduced in their practice.

Nor have these corruptions hitherto, been productive of evil. I have yet to learn, which of all the many privileges possessed by the people, has been permanently invaded with the sanction of Parliament, in its present form. It would be wholly beyond my object, as my limits, to enter into even a general review of all the subjects, which have come under consideration in the House of Commons, as actually framed; though it would not be difficult to show, that the voice and apparent interests of the people, had always been fully attended to,

in their discussion. If it were not so, and if, as is now alleged, the object of Ministers be to govern by corrupt majorities in the House; how comes it, that in modern times, so much has been done to guard the subject against that very corruption? In this reign, the Judges have been made independent of the Crown, and thereby, the equal administration of the laws placed, as far as human nature admits, beyond the reach of influence. In this reign, excise officers, and others, more immediately under the direction of the Crown, have been prevented from voting, and contractors from sitting, as members in the House. In the very last session of Parliament, the elections for many boroughs were declared void, one was disfranchised, and the privileges of another still remain suspended, from the corrupt abuse of their rights. How much from time to time, in the way of direct enactment and of indirect resolution, has been in this reign effected, towards the reduction and final abolition of sinecure places! How much has been accomplished, towards the emancipation of religious opinion, in the privileges communicated to Dissenters, and the restrictions withdrawn from Catholics! In short, it needs only a candid and impartial review of the transactions of the Commons, since the accession of George the Third, compared with those of any preceding period of similar dura-

tion, to be convinced, that the liberties of the subject have been enlarged and guaranteed, in full proportion to the general increase of intellect. Every article of expense, civil, ordinary, and extraordinary, has been investigated; every wish and feeling of the people consulted. Of late years, the gainful traffic in slaves has been proscribed at the dictate of their humanity: more recently, the income-tax was given up to their will; nor is there any measure, in which the people could be competent judges, that has been carried against their wish.

Is it to this answered, that taxes have been imposed foreign to the interests, and in opposition to the choice of the people? I say, it was by the will of the people, and with the full consent of the majority, taken not only in the House of Commons, but through the medium of the public press, that sensorium of public opinion, that the late war, of vast and unforeseen expense, should be undertaken. The burden of taxation, now complained of, is but the necessary provision for that expense. The people rushed upon the cause, and have no right to censure the effect. Had the House been then, composed of representatives popularly chosen, and guided by popular feeling; that House so composed, must by their votes, have sanctioned the war, and consequently, by taxation in one

form or another, provided for its expenditure. Shall I be told, that the Habeas Corpus, the great bulwark of personal freedom, has been frequently or needlessly suspended, or that gagging bills have been wantonly and uselessly introduced, and thus the liberty of the subject unnecessarily infringed? I say, without entering into a discussion of each individual instance, that such measures have only been adopted at particular crises, and when sanctioned by committees, indifferently chosen from either side of the House, composed as well of those members usually voting with Ministers, as against them; that they have continued but for short times, and been relinquished as soon as the necessity, which forced their adoption, had ceased to operate. In every state, supreme authority must rest somewhere, and despotic power be sometimes exercised; the Romans had their dictators. For the power thus intrusted to Ministers, they have always been responsible directly to the bar of the House, and indirectly to public opinion; and in this country, no Minister can long maintain himself against the latter more than the former. If Government is to be upheld at all, it must occasionally be supported in opposition to the feelings of many of the governed. Besides, I deny, that we have satisfactory evidence, that all or any of these temporary assumptions of arbitrary

power, were against the sense, or the feelings of the majority of the nation. In estimating popular opinion, we must remember, that the judgment of the larger part of the people, the whole of the agricultural population, is but little heard. Scattered over the surface of the land, and separated into individuals, their weight is rather perceived than obtruded. The manufacturers, on the other hand, collected into masses and occupying a few large towns, make their united noise, sound like the voice of the people; but they have no right to exclude from that name, the most numerous and wealthy classes of society, who occupy and cultivate the soil.

What then could a House of Commons, chosen on the absurd principle even of universal suffrage, have effected, which the House, as now constituted, has not accomplished? Would it have better protected, or more enlarged, the liberties of the subject? Would it, or indeed, consistently with good government, could it, have more attended to the voice and will of the people? Must it not have engaged in the late war, which rendered necessary our now oppressive burdens? I know it will be said in reply, by the partisans of reform, that a House of Commons, more popularly chosen, would, in the conduct of the war, have been less lavish of

the public money; and not, by its corrupt majorities, imposed every tax the Minister required, or approved of every scheme he thought fit to suggest.

Success in war, mainly depends on secrecy of plan and vigour of execution. The adoption of this maxim, enabled Buonaparte to carry the French arms to a pitch, which threw the world into astonishment, and laid Europe at his feet. Chatham, our great war minister, had taught him the lesson. Nor was it, till we again followed the same course, that complete success crowned our efforts. But what minister, not endowed with the fervent patriotism, the noble courage, the brilliant talents of a Chatham, would have presumed to form any plan, or attempt any measure, however necessary, which in its result must, at least, have been doubtful, while parliamentary impeachment was suspended over his head, by the fine-drawn thread of the chances of success? What secrecy could have been observed, or what promptness used, if the opinion of the House of Commons were first to be taken on every scheme proposed? Who could venture to act in the government, if ill success were always attended by parliamentary inquiry? Yet, what guarantee has a British statesman against this terror, except the confidence of a majority in the House; and

how, without such a majority, can any Minister in this country conduct the affairs of the state? The plan of Government, to be respectable or formidable, must be consistent with itself; but how can it be consistent, if not in its detail, supported by Parliament?

If then, the late war was to be engaged in, and by the better sense of the majority of the nation, in the year 1792, it was a just and necessary war, it should have been prosecuted with secrecy and vigour: for, if the war was necessary, success in the war was not less necessary. The certainty of a majority in Parliament could alone have given to the ministry of the day, that secrecy in planning and vigour in executing which was essential to success.

In the expenses of the war, a niggard economy, which wasted its millions to save its tens of millions, was, in obedience to the wish of Parliament, followed but too long. Alliance after alliance was broken down, and power after power humbled, before the revolutionary energy of the French arms, supported, as they were, by the pillage of prosperous war. The autumn of 1811 saw every port in Europe, except Lisbon, closed against our flag; and the only spot beyond our islands, on which the British ensign might fly unchecked, was the guarded entrench-

ments before Santarem. At that time, our Cabinet was, almost hopelessly, intriguing for a new confederation of the Northern States, and the last stake of our country seemed shut up in an obscure corner of Portugal, watched by superior foes. The kingly power passed into other hands, and as if the cloud of our misfortunes had sunk with the retiring Sovereign, the sun of our prosperity rose with the full investiture of the royal dignity and prerogative on the person of the new. Fresh vigour animated our councils, and we awoke, as it were a giant, from our slumber. They, who but a few months before, had compared England and France to two men up to their chins in water, struggling which could drown the other, were astonished to see the contest already nearly decided. In the south of Europe, a single campaign, without one pitched battle, freed a kingdom from the presence of the enemy. In the north, an empire threw off the yoke of servitude, and became great by daring to be free. Gladly would I now follow the uninterrupted tide of our successes; gladly would I show, kingdom after kingdom, and empire after empire, bursting asunder the shackles of French dominion, and rushing to imitate the example and emulate the glories of the British name. How proudly should I watch the future progress of the war to the final seal of our conquest at Waterloo, to

its glorious termination at Paris! But our triumphs need not be recalled to the memories of Englishmen. Familiar to our own minds, they will form the tale, with which we shall delight our children's children. Nor for my present purpose is it necessary. It is sufficient to say, that our success was never so brilliant, as when our expenses were unlimited; that we then only triumphed completely, when first we learned, and practised what we had learned, that the most liberal prodigality was the wisest economy. In 1814-15, the money raised in this nation, in a single year, by loans and taxes, amounted to above one hundred and thirty millions; and in the same year, the emancipation of Spain was finally effected, France first witnessed our victories, and received the law from our arms.

Who is the man, that would have cut short the successes of his country, or given breath to her failing enemies? Who would have saved his purse, to lose so bright a glory? Had the Parliament then spoken, what the patriots of to-day, falsely term the voice of the people, would it have held any other language, than that it pronounced, when it determined on bolder conduct and greater expenditure in the prosecution of the war, than this country had ever before witnessed? Would not half mea-

asures have been destructive, when undivided energy was necessary to our salvation?

A House of Commons, then, chosen on the principle of universal suffrage, would, if acting wisely, have supported the ministry by its majorities; have imposed on the people the burdens which the wants of the nation needed, and produced the same effects as have actually resulted. Let us now consider, what is required in annual Parliaments. Here I would premise, that the original constitution of Parliament knew nothing of annual, or any other fixed duration. The King, wanting supplies in aid of his military tenures, or to effectuate some object, in opposition to his great feudal vassals, sought to strengthen his measures by the apparent consent of the commonalty. For this purpose, whenever he saw it expedient, or felt it necessary, he issued his writs to the counties and towns, requiring them to choose members to represent them in Parliament, and called upon his subjects to vote him, by their representatives, the necessary assistance, or give weight, by their acquiescence, to his projected laws. When once the business for which the Parliament had come together was finished, the members were sent home, till another occasion required again the presence of the Commons, which was produced by fresh writs, and new elections. We are not, however, with-

out instances, of a very early date, of the King's summoning the same members to a second Parliament.

But, without adverting to times in which parliamentary transactions are obscured, as much by their own insignificance, as by the darkness of the period, and the subsequent lapse of ages, our object is to treat of the advantages or disadvantages of annual Parliaments, if now adopted. The chief advantage proposed is this, that the members, being more frequently returned to their constituents, the people would have an earlier opportunity of displacing them, if they neglected their duty, and more frequent means of directly manifesting their approbation, or disapprobation of the measures of Government. As far as I can find, this is the whole good proposed in annual Parliaments.

The avowed object of annual Parliaments, is therefore, nothing more than to give the people, by their means, a direct and immediate control over the measures and objects of Government: and what is this, but popular government, or a government guided by the will of the people; and what is popular government, but pure democracy; and how is pure democracy consistent with a mixed form of constitution? If the untempered will of the

people were to rule, where would be the use of King or Lords? As they were felt in Cromwell's time, they would again seem unnecessary incumbrances on the State machine. The people would now, as then, outvote the Sovereign and his Peers; and where, in that event, would be the glorious constitution, about which these Reformers are never weary of declaiming? Visionary enthusiasts! they will not see the pit they dig, till that venerable fabric they profess to repair, shall be swallowed up in its abyss. Yet, these men presume to talk of the constitution, and would deceive us by their vain pretensions of reverencing its institutions.

But suppose these results, so pregnant with mischief, should not directly follow from the proposed amendment of our system; yet, the means of direct interference, which this frequent appeal to the people, for the choice of their representatives, would give to popular feeling in the affairs of Government, must be greatly prejudicial to a large and flourishing state. What is so fluctuating as public opinion? Who so liable to be dazzled by glitter, and led away by false lights, as the people? What steadiness, what consistency could be expected from a government conducted under their immediate suffrage? That war, which sound principles of policy, to-day induce them to approve, ill suc-

cess to-morrow makes them condemn; and, again, a turn in the tide of affairs soon raises a clamour for its continuance. That alliance, which to-day, the people think their salvation, becomes to-morrow, the object of their abhorrence. This branch of commerce, which now, they eagerly wish to promote to the utmost, is soon left to its own obscurity, when events have opened other channels of industry. No power could contract alliances, or trust to engagements, which depended upon the breath of the many for their observance. Without, we should be isolated; within, torn by the opposition of party, or controlled by the turbulence of faction. Every demagogue, who gained the ear of the multitude, would in turn seize the helm of the State, and every change hurry us one step nearer to destruction. The same unsteadiness, which prevailed in our external policy, would shake our internal polity. If laws were made, magistrates would hardly venture on their execution, knowing, that the slightest heaving of the troubled wave of popular feeling, would not only repeal the law, but hold its executors, to some extent, accountable for its effects. In our plans there would be no secrecy, in their pursuit no firmness.

But suppose that to happen, which has never happened yet, and which by no moral possi-

bility ever can happen. Suppose that the people saw clearly their own interests, and adhered to the measures of their own choice; that public opinion was arrested in its fluctuations and fixed in one current; so that it became possible to conduct, according to the voice of the people, the government of a great nation, possessed of large foreign dominions, intricate in its external relations, and complicated in its internal interests. It must nevertheless be admitted by every one, who considers the nature of elections as now conducted, that if more frequent, they would only give greater opportunities and facilities for corrupting the people. Influence and bribery would be but the more constantly and the more sedulously active. Were it otherwise, either a great part of the wealth and rank of the nation would go unrepresented, or we must altogether abandon the principle of a representative government; for, only by means of what is termed influence and corruption, is the representation proportioned to the riches and dignity of the individuals represented.

Besides, if the elected were so often returned to the electors, would there not be danger, lest the too frequent exercise of the elective franchise should have a tendency, to render it less regarded in itself; or lest, in time it should thus become a matter of course to return the

same members to Parliament, or allow the representation to be as it were rotary in a few families. Just as we see, in many parishes, where lucrative offices are annual, when once the officers are chosen, they are rarely rejected at a subsequent election; and, except under extraordinary circumstances, seldom take the trouble even of soliciting the votes of the parishioners. In the same way, the mayoralty has become rotary among the aldermen in London, and in other nominally elective corporations.

Nor could this re-election of course, or regular rotation of return be with any justice refused. If it be allowed, as I believe universally it is, that members of Parliament should be men of sufficient wealth, to be independent in their private fortunes, and of sufficient education, to be competent to examine all the subjects of importance submitted to their consideration; it is obvious, that such men will not attend Parliament, without proportional establishments: they will not frequent the House, otherwise than as becomes their rank in society. But, who would undertake the expense and trouble of a removal to the metropolis, and establish a residence there, for the sake of supporting the respectability of an office, which should last only one twelvemonth? Or what man is there, who would devote his time to the acquiring a

detailed acquaintance with the history and present interests of his country; a science embracing the whole range of politics, if his chance of beneficially employing his knowledge were confined to a single year? Yet such an acquisition is absolutely necessary, to well discharge the duties of a member of Parliament. Either then, the representative would require the guarantee of custom for his re-election; or when chosen, he would remain in his mansion to the neglect of his constituent's interests, and the welfare of the nation. Gentlemen could not in common prudence be expected, to give up their habits and residences at home, either to form new establishments for a single year, or to appear in the House in a figure unbecoming the respectability of their families.

Would you avoid this difficulty; your choice must fall on needy adventurers, men who could have no education to enlighten them on your true interests; no family honour to soil by the infamy of their conduct; alike without guides to the right, and without guards against the wrong. For, only the meanest and most desperate would undertake an office, which attended with expense, should annually expose them to the malignity of slander, and the uncertain breath of popular approbation. Think

you such men, the clamours of whose creditors, and the necessities of whose families, would force their votes into the market, for any who deemed them worth the purchase, would be less likely to accept the proffered corruption, than those, whose affluence places them beyond the pinchings of need, whose education gives them sound principles of right, and whose character and stake in society add every impulse to its pursuit? No! if you would have your interests well attended to in Parliament, you must elect men of competent fortune and education; and such men will not stoop to accept an office dependent on the annual will of the ever-changing multitude; such men cannot submit to this, the lowest degradation, the most abject slavery. They will not voluntarily, every succeeding year, place their name and reputation at the mercy of an angry and misled populace.

But suppose, for a moment, the same class of men would accept the trust, and having accepted, would execute it, under annual, as they now do under septennial elections. Is not the balance of our constitution preserved, the encroachments of power restrained, the profligacy of Ministers exposed, and the liberties of the subject protected; is not the whole system of the State kept in full and vigorous operation, by an opposition in Parliament? If there were no

opposition in the House, there would be no inquiry into, and consequently, no remedy for abuses ; the influence of the Crown would rise above the privileges of the people, and give the law to each of the other branches of the Legislature. But, for opposition to be strong, it must be the opposition of party. Powerless indeed, would be a resistance to the measures of a Minister, which was maintained only by the sentiments of individual members, acting without union or system. Profligates in place would easily protect themselves against the desultory attacks of such an opposition, which they, from their very situations, would resist with conjoint and systematic strength. Opposition always frustrated and unavailing, would become first contemptible, then languid, and at last wholly cease. To form the opposition of party, the members must have had experience of each other's sentiments : they must know on whose steadiness they can depend : they must be able to act in union from mutual confidence ; and how could they acquire this experience or obtain this confidence, from the short limit of a single session ? While they were learning each other, the measures of the Minister would be already carried ; and before a party could be formed to oppose them, the whole scheme would be disturbed by a new election.

If such then, be the disadvantages of annual Parliaments; if they be inconsistent with the well-being of our state, by introducing to our councils the fluctuations of public opinion; if they be foreign to our constitution and incompatible with its existence in its present mixed form; if they have a tendency, either to perpetuate the annual, or rotary, return of the same members to Parliament, or otherwise, to send thither only the needy and incompetent: if they be destructive of that mutual acquaintance and confidence, on which alone regular and systematic opposition to the encroachments of prerogative can be grounded: what compensation do they offer for all these evils? An earlier opportunity, forsooth, for the people to reject such of their representatives as either do, or seem, to desert their interests. But is it quite clear, that the people always know their own interests: or is it quite certain, that a single session is a sufficient test of the whole political career of their representatives? If this shall be answered affirmatively; is it then conclusively evident, that the people would not again return those very members, with whom a party or a faction might find the most fault? Is this so absolutely out of all experience, that we have never heard of it under the present system; or, rather, is it not so much a matter of every day's experience, that we cannot doubt its being

so under every system? For let it be remembered, and we ought never to forget it, that these noisy reformers, who would have the Crown and Constitution laid at their feet, to satisfy the wild speculations of their useless theories, do not compose the people, nor even the majority of the people. The mass of the population is scattered over the face of the country, separated so far as to be little heard, yet so mighty as to be irresistibly felt.

It is then apparent, that this proposed annual appeal to the people, would be productive of many positive disadvantages, balanced but by a very questionable benefit. And shall we allow this more than doubtful good, outweighed as it is, by so many certain ills, to seduce our affections from the institutions of our fathers; or render valueless our noble constitution: a veneration for which, is the birthright of every Englishman, is imbibed in his cradle, grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength: a veneration for which, we are proud to acknowledge, not as a prejudice, though even in that light it is respectable, but as the conviction of our reason, confirmed by our experience? A veneration, which originating in the natural regard we all feel for the institutions of antiquity, is riveted on the English

constitution, by the warmest feelings of gratitude and love ; gratitude for personal protection, and love for the bulwark of our country's liberties.

Nor is this the whole excellence of our constitution. The very advantages, which the Radical Reformers, propose from annual Parliaments, are all afforded by the present system. When our ancestors struggled and contended for annual Parliaments, it was not annual elections that they meant ; but annual meetings of Parliament ; that the subject might always know, where to apply for a redress of his grievances, if the Crown should at any time oppress his weakness, or become deaf to his complaints. This annual meeting of Parliament, is now amply secured, not only by the wants of Government, but also by the yearly term of the mutiny bill. Should but one year elapse without the assembling of Parliament, all the bands of military subordination would be loosed, or at least become illegal. The Crown cannot support its dignity, without an armed force, and can only maintain that armed force by virtue of the mutiny bill, which is annually passed to continue in operation but one year. The annual Parliaments therefore, for which our fathers contended, are secured to us, as well by the wants of the State, as the necessity of an army : with-

out an annual meeting of Parliament, the one could have no supply, and the other no existence.

By the present constitution, once in seven years our representatives are returned to us for our censure or approbation. I do not advocate septennial Parliaments, as if there were magic in the number seven, nor do I think that term of duration to be very preferable to six or eight years, except as it is the established period. But, it is such a period, as allows a Minister to become acquainted with the sentiments of the House and develope his plans in their results; it is such a period, as gives a consistency to the schemes and pursuits of Government, and allows the people a fair opportunity of trying the whole political character of their representatives: while, on the other hand, the time is not so long as to encourage the representatives in negligence or misconduct from any fancied immunity.

If it be said, that it is better worth the while of a corrupt Minister to bribe a septennial than an annual Parliament; I reply, that it is provided by the constitution as it exists, that when a member accepts pension or office from the Crown, he shall return to his constituents, who have it in their free power to mark their

disapprobation of his corruption, or their mistrust of his dependence, by refusing his re-election. This is as good a check on the undue influence of a Minister over the representatives, as could be found in annual elections: it is better, inasmuch as it is more immediate and already established.

Nor is this the only barrier which our excellent constitution opposes to the growth of corruption among the Commons. The royal prerogative itself creates another. If, indeed, it be worth while, and from the baseness of mankind, be supposed possible for a Minister, under the hope of secrecy, to tamper with the majority of the House; how can he know, or certainly persuade himself, that the Parliament will have a seven years' duration? The Crown may at any time exert its constitutional powers, and send back the representatives to their electors. Nor does the Crown ever refuse the exercise of this prerogative to the prayers of the country offered on reasonable grounds: and what ground can be so reasonable, as that the system pursued by the Administration, is arbitrary in its oppressions, or mistaken in its object; that a majority of the House has become so indifferent, as to neglect, or so wicked, as to betray the interests of their constituents? And these, or some of these, must be the result of the corruption of

which I am now speaking; for no one, I presume, would wish to restrain the power of influence, or of gold, when employed to secure majorities on right measures, to protect the people, or promote the welfare of the State. If faction votes the House of Commons corrupt, and no longer worthy the confidence of the country, the Crown may indeed be deaf to its remonstrance. To listen to such petitions, originating in the spleen of disappointed ambition, the erroneous views of political zealots, or the treasonable designs of false patriots, would be to surrender the reins of Government to the most noisy and seditious, and abandon the State to the guidance of popular violence.

While therefore, the Crown, considering its prerogatives as vested in its hands, as much for the protection of the people, as the support of its own dignity, uses them to guard men against their passions, and refuses petitions, bearing on their front the stamp of the madness, or sedition from which they have sprung; the King is ever indulgent to the wishes of his people, and at their request would always avail himself of his power of dissolving Parliament. No instance within the last half century can be cited to the contrary, while many might be produced to prove the truth of the assertion. Is it said, the Crown refused the voice of the country

for the dissolution of the last Parliament; I answer, the country never required it. The proof of this, is the nature of the Parliament now returned. How does this House of Commons essentially differ from the former; and what would have been the utility of a violent disruption in the machine of Government, for the mere purpose of having the same or similar members sent back?

Since then, septennial Parliaments offer us in their natural duration, all the benefits of a consistent government, with the opportunity of developing and completing the schemes of a Minister; while yet they are not so long, or so certain, in their term, as to give the corrupt representative any hope of escaping the feeling of his constituents: since annual Parliaments promise so few, or rather such merely imaginary advantages, coupled with such enormous and frightful evils; bold indeed, must be the treason, or infatuated indeed, must be the stupidity of that faction, which assuming a voice it never speaks, the voice of the people of England, has dared to call so loudly for annual Parliaments. All that ever was proposed of good from annual elections, we enjoy under the present system: their security from corruption, the necessary frequency of appeal to the people, and the certainty that every year there must be a House of Commons, open to the hearing and examination

of the complaints of the subject. But our admirable constitution, framed in the wisdom of past ages, and perfected by the experience of centuries, leaving far behind, the puny wisdom of these modern empirics, adds to these advantages all the consistency and steadiness of a permanent government. It at once secures the liberties of the subject, the dignity of the Crown, and the glories of the country. Who is there, then, so rash as to follow the call of these deluded or these artful men? who so dull as not to perceive that their clumsy repairs would loosen the keystone of the mighty arch of our state, beneath whose shadow a world reposes in peace?

Is further proof of the wild designs, or the wicked ends, of these Radical Reformers necessary? Look at the means they employ to accomplish their purposes. They know that a good Christian must be a good subject; that he who is true to his God cannot be false to his King; that he who thinks rightly on religion will not be wholly misled in politics. Therefore, they enlist beneath their banners infidelity and Deism. They impudently tell us, all that reason sanctions and religion enjoins, is a bugbear and a fable. Seeking to destroy the institutions of our fathers, they commence by attacking the foundations of our faith, and not content with

shaking the pillars of the State, raise their sacrilegious hands against the altars of our God. Traitors in their politics and infidels in their religion, they would draw us through their infidelity into their treasons. Fit means for such an end! Foully slandering the name of reason, they convert it into a cover for their blasphemies, an instrument of our deception. These reformers in politics will adopt nothing in government but what their perverted views of reason approve, and become infidels in religion, when an infinite God presumes to be incomprehensible to his creatures. As if nature, as if art, as if themselves, had not depths their limited understandings would in vain endeavour to fathom; and as if He, who formed nature, who endued man with the intellect that created art, and framed him a wonder to himself; as if that great Being alone had no right to mystery. They again start doubts, ten thousand times repeated, and ten thousand times refuted, and again compel us to tread the ground so often trod before, and once more recapitulate their refutation.

If there be a God, as, by all the evidences of nature, and the common consent of mankind, there must be, that God must be almighty: He must have created us, for we could not have formed ourselves; and having created us, there

is nothing improbable in the supposition of his communicating to his creatures some revelation of his will. At least, to an almighty God, to whom all things must be possible, this could not be impossible. Examine then, the proofs we have, that the books contained in the Holy Bible are indeed this revelation; and, if it be admitted, that there is any truth in history, or that any fact can be believed, which does not pass before our own eyes, as, that our fathers were born, though we did not witness their birth, we shall be satisfied, not only that God has made his revelation to mankind, but that the Scriptures contain that revelation. Such a revelation must certainly be out of the ordinary course of nature, and therefore miraculous; but the miracle furnishes no argument against its existence, unless we restrict the power of an almighty God to the narrow bounds of his own creation. Once limit his power, and he is no longer almighty; if not almighty, he is no longer God.

The revelation being made, and miraculously made, is it to be supposed, that every thing that an infinite God should communicate to man must necessarily be within the reach of his finite capacity; particularly when, by the very terms of the revelation itself, many things contained in it are proposed as matters of faith, and no-

thing as mere matter of information? Is the omniscient God to restrain his intelligence to our pigmy faculties, or be told by our blasphemous pride, his communications are useless or false? What! cannot He that framed us, and whose essence is far beyond our comprehension, teach us any mystery as the proof of our faith, the evidence of our dependence on him, without our withdrawing our allegiance, and denying him for our God? For eighteen centuries the Holy Scriptures have been the hope and joy of the wise and good; and shall these men presume to set up their opinions against the wisdom of past ages; to tell us that the lessons of our cradles were fables, and that the best-founded of our opinions are senseless prejudices? Such a wilfulness of conduct is indeed consistent for those, who dare to judge their God, as preparatory to the condemnation of their King. They have an interest in destroying all that is established in order and venerable from age; all that is founded on morality or sanctioned by reason: because, their aim is to disturb all order, to overturn every establishment, to confound all sense of right and wrong, and lead men to the commission of the most atrocious crimes, by the abuse of all reason. But for us, for those who reverence their God, or believe in his revelation—who love their country or venerate her institutions—who enjoy the respect of themselves or

of others—for us to league with such men would indeed be madness. If for a moment, by insisting on particular blemishes in practice, they have deceived us into a belief that our whole system needed reform, let us, at once, abandon their ranks and return to the institutions of our fathers, assured, that the change they offer is fraught with evils vastly greater than those we flee from; assured, that blasphemers, who openly denounce religion and would covertly destroy the state can only ask reform for the sake of immunity; and that the same vices of head and heart which have undermined their allegiance to Heaven, have, with it, shaken their faith to their country.

Look at the private characters and situations of these men. In their circumstances, they are desperate; in their lives, abandoned; in their morals, profligate; in their conduct, dishonest: they forswear the dearest relations, the commonest observances of life, and then require that we should permit them to remodel all society. Try them by their own test: can an evil tree bring forth good fruit? or, can that be a holy design which is wrought by such unhallowed instruments, and needs for its accomplishment such blasphemous alliances? Not that every reformer is therefore an infidel, nor every infidel therefore a reformer; but if, in your

leaders, the characters be identified, take care where the infection may spread. That which you abhor to-day, to-morrow you may become; and, at least, that such men make common cause with you, should be sufficient to make you question your own actions. Are you ready to go all lengths with them? Are you ready to embrace the principles, or be guided by the practices of those, who, having blasphemously outlawed their God, seek now treasonably to overthrow their country? If not, pause for an instant—while you see many things you wish altered, and think might be amended, consider whether the present evil is not more endurable, than the proposed remedy. You have advanced to the point of danger; but it is not yet too late to retreat. The assassins of their country's best liberties, cloaking themselves in the disguise of her friends, dare now to throw aside their mask. "Already," say they, "is a revolution begun." A revolution! perish the man that names it, and does not tremble! Yes, a revolution is begun, unless we stand firm to the constitution! These seditious reformers, professing to repair, are about to destroy the fabric of our state. Their madness will drive us into anarchy, from the confusion of which, we shall gladly take refuge in despotism. Yet a revolution is to have no terrors, and be attended with no convulsions in this country. Mark

their infatuation, or their craft! they appeal for the proof of this absurd assertion to the change of kings from James to William; as if a mere change of kings, a mere transfer of the royal diadem from one head to another, had any analogy to a total overthrow of the establishment in church and state; as if that which maintained the constitution, could be compared to that which is to destroy it. As well might the peaceable devolution of the kingly office from father to son, be compared to the transfer of power in France, from Louis the Sixteenth to Napoleon Buonaparte. No! when we would read the recital of such a revolution as is now commenced in this our native land, we must look back to the four years of civil war and internal bloodshed and devastation, which laid waste our unhappy country, when the Parliament levied war against the first Charles; we must recall the proscriptions and terrors, which prevailed beneath the military tyranny of a Cromwell, "till England hardly knew herself:" or, would we see what the superior illumination of modern times can do to soften the rigours of a revolution, we must read again the bloody history of revolutionized France; we must recount the scenes at which our childhood sickened, the remembrance of which astounds our manhood. Through such scenes are we invited, to arrive

at such conclusions. These are the objects and these the means of radical reform.

Can you hesitate then which party to embrace, that of your country, or of her betrayers? Does the apparent strength of the reformers stagger you? Consider, that they are divided amongst themselves. The constitutional Whig has no more to do with radical reform, than the highest Tory. For a moment, some Opposition leaders may have committed themselves, by a coalition with reformers; but the union can never be permanent. The lover of his native land cannot trust her interests in the hands of those, whose revolutionizing war-cry is Radical reform and annual Parliaments: neither will the reformers long bear to be the tools of those, who, under pretence of supporting the cause of reform and inquiry into abuses, seek only to avail themselves of popular commotion to drive Ministers from their places. These banded confederates, now so united, have no common object. Some among them propose consitutional reform, others a reform that outrages all constitution, and is inconsistent with every government: the one party, wants place and power, the other, anarchy and revolution; objects totally incompatible. Their union is but of yesterday, their dissolution waits but for to-morrow. An alliance of the good with the bad; of the

duped with the duping; with no common interest to cement, and ten thousand opposite feelings to interrupt the harmony, cannot be of long continuance. Let not then our terrors magnify their power, nor our hesitation increase their numbers. We have only to expose their views, and steadfastly adhere to what we know to be right, in order to intimidate their insolence and keep in check their treasons.

Have you still a fear? Think of the strength of institutions so long established, supported, as they are, by the civil influence and military force of the state, grounded on the prejudices, built upon the reasons of all wise and good men. The station, dignity, wealth, and intellect of our country will all unite in their maintenance. With us there is, and can be, but one object, the support of things as they are: with those who oppose us are two objects, so distinct and contradictory, that even if they were successful against us, (and God forbid they ever should be!) they would arm themselves against each other. Single in our object, let us be determined in our defence. The reformers have their clubs and associations. They know their leaders and the centres of their union. Let us too form our associations. Let us choose our leaders and know our centres. They talk of arms; let us not neglect them. Wherever true patriotism

has already burst from its trance, let our influence, our spirit, our presence be exerted to encourage its energy. If any where it still slumbers, let us not omit to awake it. The spark is in every good man's breast, it needs but the breath of loyalty to fan it to a flame. Let us not be slothful in the day of our country's peril, but leap into the breach that treason has made in her bosom. If we must fall, at least let us fall like men, in harness; like good citizens, at our post. Once embrace this determination, and manifest it by your actions, and you will have already baffled the views of your adversaries. The cowardice of guilt will crouch before you. Let slip the moment, and you encourage the presumption, by keeping up the delusion of these men. If you are backward, they will be forward. If you are terrified, they will be daring. Show yourselves, and you will intimidate them; exert yourselves, and you will scatter them. If they are bold, it is because you are not on the alert. If they are strong, it is in your weakness. Dare to be men, and they will not dare to be traitors. Let your rallying point be, the King and Constitution; things as they are, rather than a revolution. Trust confidently the helm of your country's safety, to those who have weathered the storm of foreign war, and brought you victorious over an armed confederacy of all the nations of the earth. Be unani-

mous in loyal declarations and loyal associations, testifying at once your attachment to the existing government, and your determination to maintain it. No wise, no good man will hesitate, at a moment like the present, when anarchists dare announce a revolution already begun, to come forward to uphold by his example, by his influence, and, if necessary, by his sword, the constitution of the state. Let but every man do his duty, then shall not our religion, our laws, our land, need defenders, nor our country be without a triumph.

THE END.

